

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

November 12, 1969

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *YEL*

SUBJECT: November 13 DPRC Meeting

The Defense Program Review Committee is scheduled to meet at 2:30 this afternoon.

I understood that the purpose of the meeting was to review Department of Defense FY 71 plans for U.S. strategic programs, and in particular for the Safeguard Program, and the principals were so informed.

However, Dave Packard will not discuss Safeguard or strategic programs at the meeting. Packard is under the impression that you had agreed to discuss Safeguard with him privately and give him Presidential guidance. He is still prepared to have this private discussion, but he is apparently unwilling to have a Safeguard discussion in front of the DPRC, at least now.

Instead, Packard will discuss where DOD stands in its budget review: financial totals as of now, expected results from a further budget scrub down, the kinds of issues that will have to be decided before the final budget total is reached.

Since Packard thinks he has an understanding with you not to discuss Safeguard at a DPRC meeting, a confrontation with him at the meeting would be embarrassing and would probably not serve any useful purpose.

NSS, OSD and
JCS reviews
completed

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

Instead, I suggest you

-- ask Packard at the meeting to discuss where DOD stands in its budget review and let him present what he wants to present. You and the others can then ask him questions that will elicit at least some information on Safeguard and strategic programs.

If you agree, I should notify the offices of the principals as soon as possible of the agenda change so that they all aren't caught completely off guard.

Approve agenda change JK

Other _____

-- get together with Packard after the meeting (he is leaving for Vietnam shortly for 10 days or so) to give him the President's guidance on Safeguard. (See memo at Tab A) Tell him

-- The President is committed to the area defense part of Safeguard, and it should be in the FY 71 budget. At least, we must have a paper laying out the options for proceeding with Safeguard as soon as possible, before the FY 71 budget is in concrete. I think DOD could produce one in a week.

-- There are rumors circulating of significant cost overruns in Phase I. The President wants a review of program costs as soon as possible. (This will take longer, but you should put pressure on him; if you think it feasible, authorize me to follow up.)

Approve seeing Packard after DPRC
(inform his office) JK

Disapprove _____

I can't tell whether Packard's presentation will contain anything interesting. Because of his apparent unwillingness to air sensitive matters at the DPRC, he may avoid any meaningful discussion.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

On the other hand, he may comment on the key issues that must be faced if DOD is to stay within its budget guidelines.

(I understand that no force cuts for NATO or Korea are planned, though the NATO readiness issue may be a problem.)

I sense, in general, that DOD has no intention of referring sensitive and important issues and alternatives to the DPRC before OSD, the Services and the JCS have agreed on the basic program.

As far as the residual disagreements between BOB and DOD are concerned, Bob Mayo's instructions to DOD (which you have seen) make it quite apparent that in his view the DPRC will play no role in the process of reviewing and resolving disagreed FY 71 budget issues or, for that matter, any FY 71 budget issues.

Unless the President says he wants the DPRC to look over the FY 71 DOD budget before he approves it for submission to the hill, it seems to me that DPRC is out of the picture as far as the FY 71 budget is concerned.

What this means is that DPRC will not be able to go into business until it has in hand the January 15 submission of the DOD Five Year Plan. Whether DOD (and BOB) will continue to "stone wall" DPRC after that is anybody's guess.

At Tab B are talking points you can use for the meeting. At Tab C is my earlier memo on Safeguard. At Tab D is my earlier memo on FY 71 budget issues.

Enclosures

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

HAK TALKING POINTS
DPRC MEETING
NOVEMBER 13, 1969

1. Dave Packard has told me that we will be able to begin our review of the complete Defense budget on 11 December.

2. Dave, I understand you are prepared today to tell us how far DOD has progressed in developing its 1971 budget.

[Depending on Packard's presentation, you may want to raise the following general questions:]

-- Do you contemplate any changes in our NATO position, for example, force cuts or changes in readiness?

-- Will you be proposing force reductions in Korea?

-- Would you outline what is involved in moving from the present force structure to one consistent with the NSDM 27 guidelines?

[If Safeguard breaks at the meeting, you might also ask the following questions:]

-- Has there been a delay in the completion date for Phase I?

-- Is Defense making proposals in the FY 71 budget to get Phase I back on schedule?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:

Al Haig

SUBJECT:

Meeting of Defense Program
Review Meeting

In attempting to set up a meeting of the DPRC this week, we have run into the problem occasioned by Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard's absence from Washington during the period Thursday, Nov. 13 through Nov. 23d or 24th.

In addition, as you know, Packard has steadfastly insisted that he is not prepared to address the key force program decisions and will not be ready until December. Unfortunately, as Larry has pointed out on several occasions, by the time that Packard is ready to talk substantively, it is probable that the FY 70 defense budget will be locked. Larry Lynn is quite concerned about this impasse and it appears that your hints to Laird have not unhinged the problem.

to Larry Lynn

4137

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 10, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *yle*

SUBJECT: FY 71 Budget Issues

You asked me to identify potential FY 71 budget issues which may have policy implications. These issues would then be discussed at a DPRC meeting in much the way the Safeguard program would be treated.

Identifying such issues is difficult now, when we do not know how Defense proposes to alter force levels or procurement plans in order to stay within the FY 71 budget guidelines set in NSDM 27. When we do receive the Defense budget, on 11 December according to Dave Packard's memorandum (Tab A), Defense will probably have finalized its position on the major force issues:

-- These major force issues will be identified within Defense by 10 November.

-- The Bureau of the Budget views on these issues will also be available by then.

-- Between 10 November and 9 December, Defense will attempt to decide these issues.

-- The budget will be finalized on 10 December when Mel Laird is expected to meet with the Service Secretaries.

-- Some unresolved force issues may remain for DPRC consideration if there is a disagreement between the Bureau of the Budget and Defense.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

I do not believe these procedures satisfy the President's interest. He wanted issues identified for his consideration on the basis of their policy implications, not because of a disagreement between BOB and DOD on specific line items. Since I doubt that there is much we can do at this late date to change the DOD procedures and schedules, I believe high priority should be given to identifying some of the possible issues before we have the budget. The major topics which should be considered are:

-- Is the overall budgetary guideline for the FY 71 Defense budget realistic?

-- Are reductions in the readiness of our NATO-committed Army units being considered in FY 71?

-- Are major changes in U.S. deployments to Asia being considered in FY 71?

-- How far should we go toward implementing NSDM 27 in FY 71?

How firm are the BOB forecasts of funds availability for the FY 71 Defense budget?

For several years now, we have had to cut the Defense budget \$3-5 billion at the eleventh hour, when little good staffing could be done. As you know, this process was arbitrary and disruptive in FY 70. We may face this problem again in deciding on the FY 71 budget:

-- In preparing the FY 71 budget, DOD is operating under guidelines which provide \$73 billion for the baseline forces, and up to \$3 billion more for SVN. These guidelines are consistent with NSDM 27.

-- However, DOD currently believes another \$300 million, or \$73.3 billion, will be needed for the baseline forces because of higher costs.

-- Mel Laird may also want more funds than are needed for the SVN war -- the full \$3 billion above the \$73.3 billion baseline -- so Defense can spend the savings the way it wants.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

-- On the other hand, the Bureau of the Budget hopes to cut back the basic Defense guideline to \$72.5 billion because more funds will be needed for non-defense agencies. These funds are needed elsewhere because non-defense government costs are rising due to inflation, higher unemployment rates, and increased Medicare; and overall revenues might fall due to lower taxes and business activity in FY 71.

The Defense budget guidelines should be reviewed by the DPRC. You could do this by asking the Bureau of the Budget to prepare an issues paper. The issues would be reviewed at a DPRC meeting in mid-November and, if necessary, referred to the President.

Will FY 71 budget constraints require us to reduce our NATO-committed forces? In addition, what changes in our Asia deployment are being considered?

In your memorandum to Elliot Richardson dealing with the 1969 Defense Program Questionnaire (DPQ 69), you said that "further reductions in the readiness of Army units (committed to NATO) which might result from our budgetary review will be personally reviewed by the President, and NATO will be informed and consulted well in advance of his decision." Moreover, you also indicated that this issue would be handled by the DPRC (Tab B). The following considerations are relevant:

-- Further reductions in the readiness of Army forces were mentioned as a possibility in the Under Secretaries Committee Report dealing with the 1969 DPQ. (Attached at Tab C.)

-- These reductions would probably result from training, personnel, and logistic deficiencies in the combat forces now located in the U.S.: two brigades of the 24th Mech Divisions (M-Day) and two Armored Divisions (Strategic Reserve).

The readiness of our NATO Army forces is unfinished business for the DPRC. I believe you should raise this issue by asking Dave Packard to plan on discussing any changes in NATO readiness resulting from FY 71 budget constraints later this month. (I understand his staff is preparing a paper already.)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

4

With respect to Asia deployments, I understand some changes in our deployments to Thailand and Korea are being considered in anticipation of decisions which might be made on the basis of the program analyses now underway. I would like to investigate these possibilities further and furnish recommendations separately.

How far should we go toward implementing NSDM 27 in FY 71?

Dave Packard has said that NSDM 27 will have little effect on the FY 71 budget because the Services, JCS, and his staff need more time to decide the best mix of forces for accomplishing the approved strategy. The important NSDM 27 issues would be raised in the FY 72 documents. (See Tab A.)

In addition, the Vietnam war generally sets the level of forces for the present; consequently, in some force categories NSDM 27 implications cannot be shown.

Despite these considerations, I believe the question of implementing the NSDM 27 strategy should be addressed at the DPRC. If it is true that it is too late to change the FY 71 budget to accord with the NSDM 27 strategy, this consensus should be reached as a result of some discussion. To do this, I believe you should ask Dave Packard to discuss the issue at a DPRC meeting, as he did in his memorandum to you.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the issues below be considered at a DPRC meeting. (If you agree, talking points will be prepared.)

Overall Budgetary Guidelines: BOB Discussion

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Reductions in NATO-Committed Forces: DOD Presentation

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Implementation of NSDM 27 in the FY 71 Budget: DOD Discussion

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Enclosures

SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

November 7, 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr.

SUBJECT: Safeguard Program

The Defense Program Review Committee was scheduled to meet to review Department of Defense plans for U.S. strategic programs and, in particular, for the Safeguard Program.

Dave Packard asked that the meeting be delayed. From our readings in Defense the issues are not especially complicated. Accordingly, I do not believe a DPRC discussion should be postponed indefinitely. Here are the main issues:

-- Has there been a delay in the overall completion date for the Phase I deployment, previously scheduled for July 1974?

-- Will Defense make proposals in the FY 71 budget to reduce delays in Phase I and to initiate Phase II or will they propose to slip Phase II a year until FY 72?

-- Have any unanticipated technical problems arisen in the research, development, and testing programs?

The Safeguard Schedule and the FY 71 Budget

The long delay in obtaining approving legislation appears to have set back the Phase I schedule. However, no one is sure how much time has been lost or what might be done, and what it might cost, to get back on schedule.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

2

Safeguard Phase I was scheduled for completion by July 1974. By then, the sites at Malmstrom, Montana, and Grand Forks, North Dakota, were to have been constructed, with equipment installed and system integration tests completed.

Construction at the sites cannot begin until next spring because of poor weather conditions. Completing Phase I will then require another 54 months, or until late 1974, which is about 3 months behind schedule assuming everything else goes as planned.

We do not know whether Defense will propose beginning to fund Phase II of the Safeguard program in the FY 71 budget.

Mel Laird may welcome delays in Phase I precisely because they enable him to postpone a decision on Phase II until FY 72. The political problems of convincing Congress that Phase II is necessary now, particularly since SALT will be underway, could appear so difficult to Defense that it may not want to raise the issue in the FY 71 budget.

No technical problems have developed which would call into question the basic feasibility of the Phase II area defense deployments. (The technical aspects of the program are discussed in more detail below.)

At least some Phase II funds, perhaps \$40 million, will probably be needed in FY 71 to avoid losing important sub-contractors. Otherwise, some argue, completion of Phase II would be delayed from 1976 to 1977 or 1978.

If we try to stay close to the previous schedule, a Phase II decision could increase FY 71 Safeguard costs from about \$1 billion to between \$1.8 and \$2.4 billion in 1968 prices. Either DOD's budget will have to be increased or other programs will have to be displaced.

The alternatives seem to be:

-- Allow Phase I to slip, put a small amount of long lead time money in the FY 71 budget for Phase II, and postpone a Phase II decision a year.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

3

-- Take action to get Phase I back on schedule and put funds for Phase II in the FY 71 budget.

My reading now is that DOD will probably go for the first alternative. If we do not find this out officially until mid-December, it will be difficult to revise the decision.

Technical Progress on Safeguard

From the technical standpoint, all five of the basic elements of the Safeguard program are progressing satisfactorily:

1. PAR System

The radar for detecting and tracking incoming warheads at long distances and calculating a point of intercept -- the PAR system -- is a current production item. No extra testing or development is necessary. Moreover, no major milestones will be reached on the PAR system until 1972 when we begin integrating the entire Safeguard system.

2. MSR System

The missile site radar system, which does these tasks at short ranges, is progressing on schedule. A major milestone has been accomplished: a prototype of the complicated antenna array was completed and is working. This component is being exercised at the Kwajalein test site, tracking our own missile shots. Other major points in the MSR development program are:

-- Link up of the MSR with a missile control system. Next March (1970) a test firing of a Spartan will be attempted using MSR controls.

-- Complete control by the MSR of a missile intercept, using an ICBM as a target and a Spartan missile to intercept. This test is scheduled for April-June 1970. An intercept test with Sprint is scheduled for November 1970.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

4

3. Spartan Missile

The Spartan system is currently in a component test stage. Since the missile is essentially a modified Nike Zeus which has been in development for ten years, the test program is relatively limited.

No problems have resulted from the firings so far. The test program will be completed in the third quarter of 1970. The next major point for the system development is a live target intercept which is scheduled for June 1970.

4. The Sprint Missile

Development testing of the Sprint missile is also close to completion -- 35 of 43 test missiles have been fired. The remaining tests will be completed during the first part of 1970. The next milestones in the program are:

- First Sprint firing by the radar control (MSR). This test is scheduled in the second quarter of 1970.

- First Sprint intercept. As mentioned above, this test is scheduled for November 1970.

With respect both to Spartan and to Sprint, a failure during the intercept phases could be serious. However, it is too early to anticipate how these tests will go.

5. Command and Control Computers

From a technical point of view, the most complex part of the Safeguard system is the command and control system. If complexity is measured in terms of numbers of instructions required, the Safeguard system is roughly equivalent to Apollo -- in both cases about one million instructions are involved. Safeguard instructions pertain to:

- Identifying targets headed for the MSR. There are about 25 seconds for this and all the other tasks.

- Differentiating other junk coming in from the warhead. The rough ratio is six to one.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

5

-- Allocating Sprint and Spartan so they can engage 60 missiles simultaneously.

-- Accommodating variations in attack strategies, failures in Sprint and Spartan firings, radar blackout, etc.

The design of these instructions has to be keyed to the actual attack phenomena the system will see. Because limited experience is available, this is being done primarily with simulations of the radar signal received from an hypothetical Soviet attack, the radar tracks for Spartan and Sprint, the nuclear blackout phenomena associated with the exchange, and variations in attack options.

On the basis of comments made by General Starbird, the project officer, and by the prime contractors, this phase of the project is proceeding satisfactorily. However, we will not really begin to see how well the software problem is solved until after 1972, when all parts of the system are installed at Malmstrom and Grand Forks and system integration tests can be run with the personnel (Army) who normally will be responsible for the system.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

November 4, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Al Haig *Al*
SUBJECT: Defense Program Review Committee

Larry Lynn is very concerned that Defense may be undertaking an effort to kill the DPRC. Dave Packard has written you a memorandum informing you that he will be unable to address the key issues at tomorrow's meeting (those covered on the attached memorandum). He adds that the information will not be available until December.

This would, in effect, put the meeting back to back with the required Budget decision and thus effectively preclude careful deliberation by the DPRC.

It is thus essential in Larry's view that you call Dave Packard in an effort to get this issue resolved. Larry feels that if they are not ready by tomorrow, there is no value in having the DPRC meeting, but rather Defense should be given a week or perhaps 10 days at the most to develop the necessary data for a meaningful meeting of the Committee.

Attachment

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

3930

Nov 1969

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger ^{1/}
SUBJECT: Current Status of ABM Program

At the first meeting of the Defense Program Review Committee last Wednesday, the Deputy Secretary of Defense indicated that the Defense Department may have reservations about proceeding with the Safeguard Program beyond the first two sites that are now being constructed. Some further investigation reveals that the status of the Safeguard Program is as follows:

--DOD and Army have firm plans to proceed only with Phase I.

Phase I consists of construction of ABM defenses at the Minuteman fields at Grand Forks Air Force Base and Malmstrom Air Force Base. As of now, no money is included in the FY 71 budget for any ABM deployment beyond these two sites--specifically there will be no money for proceeding with area defense (the so-called China threat).

--During the next two weeks, OSD will be conducting an intensive internal review of the ABM program to determine options as to how and when to proceed with additional construction. By about November 4 they expect to have the options and arguments laid out for us to review. However, this time estimate may be optimistic.

I understand that OSD's internal Safeguard review will take place roughly as follows:

--They will review each mission of Safeguard: Minuteman protection, B-52 protection, defense against China, protection from accidental attacks, protection of National Command Authorities.

--For each mission they will analyze current data on the threat.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS - 2 -

-- For each mission they will analyze alternative ways to meet the threat. For example, alternatives to Minuteman protection are making them mobile, putting them in hard rock silos, etc. Alternatives to bomber protection are dispersal of the bombers to many bases, putting them in hardened shelters, etc.

-- Based on this analysis, they will determine options for proceeding.

In this connection, I'm sure there is strong pressure from the Air Force to abandon Safeguard. They want the money for Air Force programs such as hard rock silos and mobile Minuteman, and Safeguard is directly competitive with these programs.


RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, I will call Dave Packard and tell him

-- that we must have an ABM review and preferably a review of all strategic programs the week of November 3-7, even if it is only preliminary;

-- he should make plans now to include at least the area defense of Safeguard Phase II within the budget totals so that the President isn't forced into unpleasant decisions at the last minute; and

-- a review of program costs must be scheduled at an early date.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

10/30

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

DPRC MEETING

NOVEMBER 13, 1969

In attendance: Dr. Kissinger, David Packard, General Wheeler, Alexis Johnson, Dr. Lynn, Jim Schlesinger, Ron Spiers, Richard Helms, Major Kanarowski.

DP: [Described the basic FY 71 budget and options using a tabular layout distributed at the meeting.]
Vietnam reductions reflected on the tables begin as of 1 July 1969. The first option would withdraw roughly 100,000 troops more than we have now committed ourselves to take out as of Nov. [Packard referred to Phases IV and V, with which I am not familiar.]

HAK: As I understand it then, the extreme case would be to withdraw 300,000 troops by the end of calendar 70.

DP: The end strength figure is most important in these options. We can hit these figures without SVN withdrawals by reducing CONUS forces or readiness. What we need is guidance on one of these schedules: guidance on end strength figures. If we cannot meet the end strengths because SVN withdrawals proceed too slowly, then NATO readiness would have to give.

HAK: If the President decides on Option I, II, or III -- I don't believe Schedule IV is realistic -- will it show in the budget?

DP: If Defense adopts alternative I or II, the reduction could be related to a stand down in CONUS. Also, if we commit ourselves to a budget level, we might be able to find other program reductions to take the place of VN withdrawals. No matter how we go, I don't believe the budget can be reduced below \$72.5 or \$72 billion without the pay raise.

HAK: As I understand it then, you need an end strength decision only -- not a withdrawal schedule. The President is most reluctant to commit himself to withdrawals.

DP: Yes, end strengths only.

GW: I don't believe that the withdrawal issue can easily be concealed; when Secretary Laird appears before Congress, the questions will get at the withdrawal assumptions.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

2

DP: CONUS-based readiness will have to give.

AJ: What is the NATO worst case?

GW: The 1st, 2nd, and 5th Divisions now in CONUS and committed to NATO might have to be used for training. This would be evident to our allies and should be reflected in the DPQ.

DP: This issue will have to be examined more critically.

JS: I think we are going to have to stick with \$72.5 billion or lower for defense: there is an unbalanced budget program and non-defense programs are increasing and the surtax issue is unresolved.

DP: We don't save much in FY 71 by reducing carriers to a lower level. The savings occur in out years. I believe the DPRC should address the CVA issue. As you know, during peace time we need three CVAs to maintain one on-station. During a period of crisis, one carrier out of two could be deployed; and during a war, eight out of ten. Dennis Healy told me the reasons the UK left the carrier business were that they don't want to move families overseas, and without doing that, the hardships associated with carrier duty became too great. With respect to ASW carriers, we reduced forces from six to four in order to reduce FY 70 costs by \$3 billion. In general, we can count on one out of two ASW carriers being deployed since the stations are closer to CONUS.

[There then was a general discussion of deployments to the Atlantic, the Far East, and the Middle East and the risks and gambles.]

HAK: In the Middle East, more forces are needed for ASW.

JS: The S-3 needs to be developed. [Schlesinger also made reference to NSSM 3 force levels and asked whether they are our guidance.]

DP: The NSSM 3 force levels are illustrative only. We won't let the forces in NSSM 3 be used as guidance. NSSM 3 does not go into detail on the desirability of various force levels to meet a given strategy.

HAK & GW: Yes.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

3

AJ: What is the relationship between the carriers and the SIOP? I understand they have a substantive role in the Pacific and the Mediterranean.

GW: When the carriers are not available, targets are not covered and other forces have to be committed. For example, the 7th Fleet was relieved from its SIOP task. During a contingency, these forces could be flipped back onto the SIOP with warning. Of course, they would have to move further north. The same general observations apply to B-52s. Every week I receive a briefing on the "number of degrades."

DP: With respect to carriers, we need to know how important they are for non-SIOP options.

HAK: We are losing land bases for aircraft. This raises serious doctrinal issues of what we should do with carriers. How are calculations for meeting our carrier needs made? From the point of view of non-military considerations, how many carriers are needed? I think the range is probably 12-15 with two in the Med. and probably two in SE Asia after SVN. Maybe we should have a discussion of this issue; Larry, prepare something.

GW: When we retire a CVA, we also retire four escorts and one replenishment ship.

JS: Can we rotate carrier crews like Polaris?

GW: The proposals don't meet the problem because people are the expensive item: in fact, the rotation might cost more.

HAK: CVSs are needed in the Med. I would like to leave issues III and IV on the Navy to Defnese; I don't think the Committee can make a contribution.

[Dave Packard and General Wheeler went on to describe proposed reductions III and IV. There was some question as to whether we would want to maintain forces for an amphibious operation in NATO.]

HAK: Alex, should we look at the planning for amphibious operations?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

4

[Dave Packard and General Wheeler then discussed the Marine air wing team. Dr. Kissinger said this issue could be resolved in DOD. He said what was involved were Systems Analysis-type issues, which were not DPRC concerns.]

GW: With respect to reductions of tactical Air Force capabilities, we can now deploy 14 squadrons to NATO in a short period. With the reductions proposed, a certain number of these aircraft will not be immediately ready for rapid deployment.

DP: The reductions in Air Force squadrons has an impact on deployments to Japan and Okinawa.

HAK: Alex, shouldn't we look at the effect of the Air Force reductions on our contingency plans?

AJ: Yes.

HAK: Could you give us an assessment of how this reduction in aircraft impacts on contingency plans?
[I don't know who the "you" is -- probably Packard and AJ together.]

DP: The F-111 is an internal defense issue. We have no specific commitment to NATO to deploy F-111; however, the deployment is expected as part of our force mobilization. When deployed, their primary purpose will be deep interdiction. A-7 and F-4 are also an internal matter.

RH: In other words, for big reductions in the budget, big decisions are needed.

HAK: Let's meet again on the NATO issue: I need a brief assessment of the effect of budget reductions on the readiness of NATO forces and State views of the diplomatic and political consequences of these reductions. Then we may have to make some recommendations to the President. Alexis Johnson and Ron Spiers should do this. Admiral Johnson will give them the impact of the reductions on our contingency plans.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

5

DP: With respect to the F-14 and F-15 issue, these aircraft are useful in SE Asia. They have a longer range and better load capabilities. They also are the modernization aircraft we need for the 1975-83 period. However, getting cost down will be a big problem.

[Packard then turned to strategic force issues.]

DP: On Minuteman, we will have 10 in FY 70 and 110 in FY 71. This is a stretch-out and reduction of earlier planned deployments. FY 71 costs are reduced by \$180 million, but the long-term cost will increase by about \$50 million. We could have 210 by FY 72, 330 by FY 73, 446 by FY 74, 500+ by FY 75. This decision pushes the Minuteman modernization problem out in front. As a result of Congressional action on Poseidon, we have reduced modernization from 7 to 3 for FY 71. [This means we would have 16 out of the 31 Poseidon modernized by the end of FY 71.] We also intend to implement the stellar navigational capability program. This will cost \$21 million. We should take another look at this problem.

The strategic bomber presents a big problem in the long run; however, the FY 71 implications are not great. We are looking at three alternatives saving from \$138 million up to \$252 million: The Secretary of the Air Force is recommending something inbetween. Should we look at this issue (AMSA) in the Committee?

HAK: Larry, do this.

DP: I will furnish back-up material on the AMSA issue.

HAK: Do we have a big problem with Poseidon?

GW: It takes a long time to refit Poseidon missiles with MIRVs -- one year. Three are now in for refit.

DP: The FY 71 budget includes \$958 million for Safeguard. The FY 70 budget included \$893 million. There is a little delay in the progress: completion date is now Sept. 1974 for Phase I.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

6

There are three alternatives for Phase II: defense of MM, defense of bombers and areas, and overall China defense. Phase II would be completed by 1976. FY 71 outlay is roughly 1/3 what is shown on the table. I think we ought to discuss Safeguard next time.

HAK: We need enough of Phase II to show a commitment to China area defense.

DP: When we look at alternatives, we will have to decide whether we should include Washington, D. C.

HAK: The alternatives should focus on area defense for CONUS. I would like Dave to give us two alternatives for an area defense.

DP: The modified area defense would be using four sites covering the four corners of the U.S. and some radars oriented against LSBMs.

JS: I think we ought to start with the Northwest.

HAK: The President wants something like that -- and let's keep away from Washington. Let's look at two alternatives, one high and one low, at a future meeting. We will also look at the NATO contingency and CVAs.

TOP SECRET